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be mentioned in conclusion. Mr. Hocking, Mr. Hollands and Mr. de Laguna not only show themselves to be in general sympathy with the purpose of bringing about a more effectual organization of collective effort in philosophy, but also express the opinion that the coöperative preparation of the proposed *Summa Metaphysica* is—despite the immense difficulties of the enterprise—well worth attempting. Their support of the project encourages the hope that at the next meeting of the American Philosophical Association some tentative beginning may be made in the execution of the undertaking. Only by such a representative and continuing body could an undertaking so large be properly sponsored and sustained.

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS.

MAY I be allowed to thank Professor Urban for his very interesting and suggestive paper on this subject in the May number of THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, and to add some remarks of my own? The difficulties of the subject I admit, and it is not quite easy to make critical references to the paper. My chief objection to it is that, like so much of the discussion of 'values,' it is one-sided and extreme in the end, the result being the usual one of depreciation of the values of existence or reality. One may very well agree that it would be difficult, in this case, to eliminate the value connotation from the judgment of existence or reality, and yet hesitate to make the *salto mortale* of holding that to have an inner life, and be real as a person is "just to have purposes and intentions," or of saying that "in the last analysis *we exist for ourselves* in no other way." Surely this is not the deepest conception of being.

With his fine statement of how much our knowledge of other minds is due to meanings, purposes, intentions, values, I am in very large agreement, but I can find nothing in the paper—save assertions by him and Professor Coe—to substantiate the claim that this is the whole truth. My knowledge of my friend is to be confined to purposes, meanings, intentions, that float or emanate from him, but him—as being, spirit, person—I am not allowed to know. He quotes Helen Wodehouse: "When I contemplate my friend, the contents of my mind are made of his spirit and his spiritual activity. For this is what enters my consciousness and is present to my thought." Upon this Professor Urban remarks: "True enough when properly understood. But this spirit is not some sublimation of his psychical states, but his

meanings." Of course, his "spirit is not some sublimation of his psychical states," seeing that his states rather belong to his spirit, but it seems rather captious to demand that the statement of Dr. Wodehouse be "properly understood." Why must it be eviscerated of its natural meaning? Is it not clear? It is clearer than Professor Urban's paper on the issue, and more satisfactory in statement. I have said elsewhere, and in my own way, what comes to substantially the same thing. Why should I not know, both *that* the 'spirit' of my friend is, and *what* his spiritual activities are? Does not Professor Urban himself blame the functionalists for "elimination of the *selves* for which meanings *are*"? Why then does he not allow these selves to be known, but only their purposes and intentions? Is there to be no direct apprehension of spiritual being? Elsewhere, he has contended, and rightly, that reality is the support of value. Why are the values here to be allowed no support in reality? Or at least why must the reality that supports them be so hidden and ignored? A good deal of this discussion of 'values' treats reality or existence as a widowed mother would do if she were ashamed of the son who was her support. I am not saying Professor Urban does so, but the impression of his paper is not happy on the point.

Nor do I find any recognition of the objection, which some might raise, that the repeated stress on the fact that my friend's subjective states, his sensations and emotions, are his, and not sharable by me, is just as true, in that sense, of his subjective states of purpose and intention, though the paper never touches on the point. As I have said, the paper is another case, for anything that guards to the contrary, of our being allowed to know the 'grin' but not the 'cat,' and, if there is any other way of knowing, we are told that we are "welcome to it." Well, a deeper mode of knowing is welcome to some of us, while we accept the *pro tanto* knowledge which valuing process, as of purposes and intentions, brings to us. Varisco says: "My value is a value of being. Who doubts it? I have value because I am." He says he means "I" with "all the constituents of the unity of consciousness." But all this existential value Professor Urban's paper appears to negate, or at least to ignore. But is it not a deeper knowledge by far, and one to which the knowledge which he gives us of purposes and intentions is complementary? We do not find those conscious acts of our friends or fellows, which we call their purposes and intentions, in the same mode or sense in which we come upon sounds or colors. These purposes and intentions are, as the paper emphasizes, different from beings or entities presented in consciousness,

and meaning is not a psychical existent; and I regret that I am unable to recognize the adequacy of the reasons for the resolution of the existential judgment that our fellows are real and have an inner life into a purely value judgment. There seems to me a good deal more to be done before we go that far.

These remarks are in no sense intended as a reply to Professor Urban's paper, nor are they meant as a criticism of it; they are a mere specification of certain aspects or points on which the paper failed to satisfy me. They are made solely from interest in the subject, and if, in making them, more required to be said of my mental attitude towards the writer, it would be supplied in the highly appreciative reference made to Professor Urban's elucidations of the subject of value in the work I have just published.

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